Recently, many crimes and scandals have been committed by Japanese police officers. Typical newspaper headlines this past September and October read: "Group Violence in Patrol Unit: Pointing Gun at Forehead"; "Policeman Extorts Woman with Seized Negative Film"; "List of 90 Investigators Leaked to Gang Group"; "Policeman Arrested for Assaulting Train Conductor, but No Punishment Given"; "Policeman Rapes Young Woman in Interrogation Room and Gives Amphetamine"; "Investigation into Case of Bodily Injury Neglected for 2 Years and 9 Months"; "Policeman Receives Amphetamine from Colleague"; and "Policeman on Patrol Molests Woman at Home".

Frequent Crimes and Scandals by Police
The Kanagawa Prefectural Police played host to several of the worst cases. Some policemen belonging to the collective patrol unit of a police station, while staying at police housing during a mission for another prefecture, attacked their fellow policeman.

In June, an officer held a loaded pistol to the head of another. The previous month, another officer was handcuffed and beaten by his peers.

In July, a policeman kicked a colleague in the face, requiring three stitches. The victim also had some of his pubic hair burned off with a lighter.

Another policeman smuggled out a roll of negative film seized as evidence from a suspect's home, and extorted a female college student in the film into having sexual relations with him and buying the film.

Although the Kanagawa Prefectural Police took disciplinary actions against the policemen involved in these incidents, they hid the scandals from the eyes of the public and did not even conduct a proper investigation of the crimes. Moreover, when these cases were reported by the media, the Chief of the Inspector's Office of the Prefectural Police, the Head of Personnel and Training Bureau as well as the Head of the Prefectural Police Headquarters tried to cover-up the crimes by making false public announcements on the scandals. Pressed by news reporters day by day, eventually they were forced to acknowledge the facts with much reluctance.

"Druggie cop let off. Kanagawa police at it again." -- it was revealed that an ex-head of the Kanagawa prefectural police and other executive officers had allegedly covered up a former policeman's drug use. The documents accusing them were sent to the prosecutors' office on November 14.

Systematic crimes by the Japanese police have also been brought to light successively. The wiretapping of the house of JCP's then International Department Head Yasuo Ogata was conducted by the public safety police. Cases of embezzlement of public money using secret accounts have been exposed in Tokyo, Aichi and Nagasaki.

Such corruption and scandals by the police, whether or not committed by individual policemen or local police organizations, are not just due to chance.

Why Japanese Police Lack Self-Cleansing Power
The lack of ability for self-cleansing is deeply rooted in the backwardness found commonly in the entire police system of Japan. Although urgent democratic reforms of the police are called for as set out below, neither the government nor top officials of the police have any will to conduct such reforms.

First, the crimes committed by policemen are not investigated promptly and strictly. Because of their status, policemen who commit crimes should be punished with more strict legal measures than ordinary citizens, and if the police are unable to investigate and charge the offenders, the prosecutors' office should take on that task.

However, the situation is just the other way around. In the wiretapping case of the house of the then JCP International department head, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors' Office, saying that they would have problems in maintaining peace and order if the police turn against them , did not indict any of the policemen directly involved in the act, thus leaving law and order itself threatened by the wiretapping. Referring to such a situation, at the U.N. Human Rights Committee meeting in 1993, Ms. Evatt (Australia), one of the Committee members, sharply criticized the Japanese Government, asking if there were two kind of laws in Japan -- one for the police and the other for ordinary citizens. The situation has not changed even now. Dealing with crimes committed by policemen, it is essential for the prosecution to lead prompt and strict investigation efforts against the police, and to indict the suspects of the crime.

Second, the investigation system within the police is not functioning properly. An inspector stationed at each prefectural police headquarters has a duty to conduct an investigation when a crime or some scandal occurs with the involvement of policemen.  When a disciplinary action is necessary, the inspector should recommend it to the chief of the prefectural police headquarters.  However, with regard to the recent scandals in Kanagawa, under the command of the chief of the prefectural police headquarters, the inspectors' office worked hard to cover-up the crimes and scandals of the policemen and took secret measures to keep up appearances. Such malfunction of the inspection system must be put right.

Third, there is a problem in the system of supervising the police.  In Japan, the National Police Agency is placed under the supervision of the National Public Safety Commission, while Prefectural Police Headquarters are supervised by Prefectural Public Safety Commissions. However, the authority of these commissions is very limited, with their personnel and structure not independent from the police system.

The Public Safety Commission system was introduced for the first time as one of the administrative commissions through the policy of "democratizing" the police taken by the U.S. Occupation Forces in the post-war period. After several revisions were made to the Police Law, now the National Public Safety Commission is given authority to administer the National Police Agency by designing and researching police systems, making a budget for the Agency, operating the police over  matters involving the public safety and so on.

However, the prefectural public safety commissions do not have authority over the administration of the prefectural police or power to appoint or dismiss the policemen. The Prime Minister has the power to appoint the members of the National Public Safety Commission and the prefectural governors appoint Prefectural Public Safety Commission members, with the consent of the Diet or prefectural assemblies only.

There is no system for the will of the people to be reflected in their appointment.  Those seeking to protect the human rights of the people and check the activities of the police are rarely, if ever,  appointed as the members of these public safety commissions. Neither the national nor prefectural public safety commissions have their own secretariat independent from the police. Therefore, they even cannot fully exercise the power delegated to them.

It is necessary that the prefectural public safety commissions be authorized to appoint or dismiss policemen, and in appointing the commission members, such systems as nomination by citizens or election by popular vote should be introduced. These members should be full-time workers and an independent secretariat must be established.

Fourth, the system of public information on the police is woefully insufficient, aggravating the secrecy of the police. At the prefectural level, there is not a single case of a prefectural police headquarters or public safety commission being subject to Freedom of Information ordinances.  At the national level, the Freedom of Information Act was finally enacted last May, which has placed the National Police Agency under the act (except for information that might hinder the ongoing investigation of a crime), but the law has not taken effect.  Recently, positive arguments for the necessity of setting up a third-party organization to check the police activities have been raised in its proposal by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, as well as newspaper editorials.

Fifth, Japanese policemen are enjoined from forming trade unions by law and their right to organize is suppressed. How can we expect policemen to protect the human rights of citizens and suspects in executing their duties, while their own human rights are infringed? Though in other countries, policemen form unions to improve their working conditions, such a fundamental human right is not guaranteed for the Japanese policemen. If their criticism against the police practices or senior officers is known to their leaders, they will be blacklisted as troublemakers and be subject to a warning or cut in their overtime payment. If they protest, they may be transferred to other positions or subject to "disciplinary measures" and be ostracized.  Suppressed in such a suffocating working environment without freedom, policemen are rather likely to commit crimes or engage in scandals as an inevitable consequence.

The JCP proposes that police be given the right to form trade unions. As an interim measure, it is necessary to promptly set up a police workers council (committee), similar to the one organized by fire-fighting workers.

Characteristics of the Japanese Police at the Root of Their Corruption
Further, the nature and structure of the Japanese police provide a hotbed for corruption. Although the Japanese police system is ostensibly based on prefectural units, neither prefectural governors nor prefectural public safety commissions have real power over the police.

With the Director General of the National Police Agency at the top, a very small number of privileged police bureaucrats (so-called career men) exercise command over the prefectural police organizations. The Japanese police are the centralized state police as well as the political police, centering on public safety mission.

In short, in the Japanese police system, (1) the priority in the organization, personnel and financing is given to the security police; and (2) the control by the bureaucrats based on the career system and hierarchy is dominant. Interacting with each other, these factors have gravely distorted the system and practices of the Japanese police. They are also the focus of discontent held by police officers actually carrying out the work.

Security Police Controlling the Entire Police System

The original mission of the police should be to maintain the safety and order of civil society by working to protect the life and assets of individual citizens and investigating crimes and arresting the suspects. Naturally, the sections for criminal investigation, traffic and crime prevention and law and order must fulfill their responsibilities.

However, the security police section, in the name of working for "public safety of the state", carry out espionage and intelligence activities or unfair oppression of the JCP or voluntary and democratic organizations which have nothing to do with crimes. Within the security police, a secret special task force, the so-called "Fourth Sub-section" is set up to conduct illegal activities of wiretapping, breaking into offices, theft or espionage against the JCP.

In the wiretapping of the JCP International head's house, the police systematically covered up the crimes committed by fellow policemen. All concerned, including the director general of the National Police Agency, the chief of the Kanagawa Prefectural Police Headquarters and the police officers who actually carried out the crime, continued to refuse to plead guilty. The public safety police are most consistent in maintaining their secrecy and lying to the public.

Further, an all-out anticommunist education is given within the police, and in the illegal activities of the public safety police, militaristic "rules" to blindly follow orders from above are especially requested.

It was under such circumstances that the policemen in Kanagawa committed group violence just like in the Japanese military in the pre-war days.

As long as the public security police, which blatantly infringe the fundamental human rights of the people guaranteed in the Constitution, hold a central position in the entire police system, it is only natural that the sense of protecting the people's human rights as well as the rights of the policemen themselves is grossly lacking.

Career System -- Root-cause of Promotion-First Tendency and Lower Sense of Responsibility
The career-system and hierarchy in the Japanese police system bring about a large status gap among police officers, as well as the strong tendency in favor of promotion and the lowering sense of responsibility.

The "careers" are those who passed the Level I recruitment examination for national civil service personnel. They account for about 450 out of 228,000 policemen in service (in FY 1999). The special promotion system stands out most among the privileges for the careers. As soon as they are hired, they become assistant police inspectors, and within some 3 years and half, they are promoted to the rank of superintendent. Then, after 6 to 7 years, they become senior superintendents; within 7 to 8 years become chief superintendents, and in 10 years or so become superintendent supervisors.

On the other hand, other "non-careers", even college graduates, have to start at the lowest rank of the police officer, and it would take at least 7.5 years or an average of 14 years to become assistant police inspectors.

If the "careers" survive the promotion race, they can become the heads of major prefectural police headquarters, such as Osaka and Kanagawa, or bureau chiefs of the National Police Agency, or even become superintendent generals (head of the Metropolitan Police Department) or the Director General of the National Police Agency.  But for the "non-careers", becoming superintendents or chiefs of small police stations may be their life-long target. Not a few policemen ruin themselves in committing crimes or causing scandals in frustration after failing in the promotion examinations.

In the present career system, those who have no experience of carrying out actual police activities such as arresting suspects become senior officers and take command of the police forces. For the police who have the responsibility of protecting the safety and human rights of the citizens, this career system is unsuitable. On top of the fact that the career elite hold the real power in the police system, centering on the security police, more and more positions of the criminal investigation police are assumed by them, resulting in the rapid deterioration in the ability of criminal investigation by the police as a whole.

With the command of the chief of the criminal investigation section, who was one of the "careers", the Kanagawa Prefectural Police failed in the criminal investigation at the initial stage in the killing of lawyer Tsutsumi Sakamoto's family by "Aum Shinrikyo" cult group.  The poor command by the career elite consequently resulted in the escalation of the crimes by "Aum" to the point it used sarin gas, expanding the damage and suffering of citizens.

Not a few whistle blowers have revealed the fact that abundant funding of the police allocated to the security police section is often skimmed off by senior police officials through dual bookkeeping of the expenses for investigations or travels. The higher the rank of police officers, the larger the amount of embezzlement grows. Though such an illegal accounting is a common practice throughout the police structure, the Board of Audit turns a blind eye to it. In this regard, it is necessary to introduce an ombudsman system to the Diet, and strengthen the right to conduct an investigation in relation to government.

The only way to regenerate and save the Japanese police from corruption is to carry out democratic reforms of the entire police organization, by abolishing the system favoring the security police, or the public safety policy, as well as the career elite system, and eradicating the practices of embezzlement.