Wednesday, March 26, 2003

-Japanese ZNet

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-Warning from history (And Japan Occupation)

By John Dower

You have written about the occupation of Japan by the United States after World War Two. Does this have any relevance to what might take place in a post-hostilities Iraq, should the United States carry out its threat to go to war against that country?

Starting last fall, we began to hear that U.S. policymakers were looking into Japan and Germany after World War II as examples or even models of successful military occupations. In the case of Japan, the imagined analogy with Iraq is probably irresistible. Although Japan was nominally occupied by the victorious “Allied powers” from August 1945 until early 1952, the Americans ran the show and tolerated no disagreement. This was Unilateralism with a capital “U”—much as we are seeing in U.S. global policy in general today. And the occupation was a pronounced success. A repressive society became democratic, and Japan—like Germany—has posed no military threat for over half a century.

The problem is that few if any of the ingredients that made this success possible are present—or would be present—in the case of Iraq. The lessons we can draw from the occupation of Japan all become warnings where Iraq is concerned.

It is difficult for most people today to imagine what the situation was like in 1945, in the wake of the Second World War. One must remember that Japan had been engaged in aggression in Asia since 1931, when Imperial Army militarists launched a successful takeover of Manchuria. Open war against China began in 1937, and the great and foolhardy “preemptive” strike against Pearl Harbor took place in December 1941—in the context of a Japanese declaration of war against the United States and European powers with colonies in Southeast Asia. Japan’s aggression was as open and audacious as that of its Axis allies Germany and Italy.

Just as is the case with Europe and the Soviet Union, we will never have an exact reckoning of the death toll of the war in Asia. China bore the brunt of Japanese aggression. Estimates vary and have tended to become inflated in recent years, but the number of Chinese who died directly or indirectly as a consequence of the war is probably in the neighborhood of fifteen million. In countries like the Dutch East Indies—known today as Indonesia—estimates of fatalities range from one million to several million. In their final frenzy in the Philippines the emperor’s men massacred around one hundred thousand civilians in Manila alone. U.S. battle deaths in the Pacific War also were approximately one hundred thousand. Japan’s own war dead numbered around two million servicemen and another one million civilians—roughly four percent of the total population at the time.

This was a charnel house in which the Japanese not only savaged others but were themselves savaged by war and militarism and their own repressive leaders. So, the dream that everyone embraced once Japan had been defeated was of a nation that would never again bring such havoc on its neighbors or, indeed, on its own people. “Demilitarization” became the watchword of the time, and it was argued that this could only be enduring if the country was “democratized” as well, so that irresponsible leaders could not repeat these horrors.

When I say that “everyone” embraced this vision of a demilitarized, democratized Japan, I have in mind not merely the victorious Allied nations but also the Asian peoples who had been so grievously victimized by the Japanese war machine—many of whom remained at war’s end colonial subjects of the British, French, Dutch, and Americans. I also have in mind the great majority of the Japanese, who found themselves not only bereaved but also living in a country utterly devastated by a miserable, losing war. Even people who are familiar with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that preceded Japan’s surrender in August 1945 often are unaware that the U.S. terror-bombing raids that came before them—aimed primarily at destroying civilian morale—had pulverized large portions of 64 other major cities. Tokyo, for example, had been mostly reduced to rubble.

It is important to keep all this in mind when we begin to talk about drawing lessons from Japan that might be applicable to Iraq after any projected U.S. hostilities. The postwar occupation of Japan possessed a great intangible quality that simply will not be present in the event of a U.S. war against Iraq. It enjoyed virtually unquestioned legitimacy—moral as well as legal—in the eyes of not merely the victors but all of Japan’s Asian neighbors and most Japanese themselves. Japan had been at war for almost fifteen years. It had declared war on the Allied powers in 1941. It had accepted the somewhat vague terms of surrender “unconditionally” less than four years later. Quite the opposite can be anticipated if the United States attacks and then occupies Iraq. The United States will find the legitimacy of its actions widely challenged—within Iraq, throughout the Middle East and much of the rest of the world, and even among many of its erstwhile supporters and allies.

What other factors contributed to the success of postwar policies in Japan, and how might these be relevant to an occupation of Iraq?

What made the occupation of Japan a success was two years or so of genuine reformist idealism before U.S. policy became consumed by the Cold War, coupled with a real Japanese embrace of the opportunity to start over. There are moments in history—fleeting occasions of opportunity—when people actually sit down and ask, “What is a good society? How can we bring this about?” Winners in war do not ask this of themselves. Winners tend to say we won, we’re good, we’re righteous, what we did was just, now it’s time to get back to business and build on our strengths. But losers—certainly in the case of Japan—are under more compulsion to ask what went wrong and what they might do to make sure they don’t fall into the same disasters again.

American policy toward defeated Japan meshed with this Japanese sense of failure and the necessity of starting over. The Americans may not have been self-critical, but they had definite ideas about what needed to be done to make Japan democratic. Much of this thinking came from liberals and leftists who had been associated with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s progressive New Deal policies—policies that were already falling out of favor in Washington before the war ended. One might say that the last great exercise of New Deal idealism was carried out by Americans in defeated Japan. It was this combination of the Americans using their “unconditional” authority to crack open the old authoritarian system and Japanese at all levels seizing this opportunity to make the reforms work that accounts for the success of the occupation.

The reforms that were introduced in the opening year and a half or so of the occupation were quite stunning. They amounted to a sweeping commitment to what we now call “nation-building”—the sort of hands-on commitment that George W. Bush explicitly repudiated in his presidential campaign. The Americans introduced in Japan a major land reform, for example, that essentially took land from rich landlords, eliminated widespread tenancy, and created a class of small rural landowners. The argument for this was that rural oppression had kept the countryside poor, thwarted democracy, constricted the domestic market, and fueled the drive to control overseas markets. We introduced labor laws that guaranteed the right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike, on the grounds that a viable labor movement is essential to any viable democracy. We encouraged the passage of a strong labor standards law to prevent exploitation of workers including women and children. We revamped both the content and structure of the educational system. In all this the input of Japanese bureaucrats and technocrats was essential to implement such reforms, and serious grass-roots support was basic to their survival.

One of our major initiatives was to create an entirely new constitution. There were no citizens in Japan in 1945. There was no popular sovereignty. Under the existing constitution, sovereignty was vested in the emperor and all Japanese were his “subjects.” So, the Americans drafted—but the Japanese translated, debated, tinkered with, and adopted—a new national charter that remains one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. The emperor became a “symbol” of the state. An extensive range of human and civil rights was guaranteed—including an explicit guarantee of gender equality. Belligerency of the state was repudiated. Changing the constitution meant, moreover, that much of the civil code had to be rewritten to conform to these new strictures concerning equality and guaranteed rights. Although the occupation ended in 1952 and there are no restrictions on amending the constitution, not a word of it has been changed.

There will be revisions in the near future, I would predict, primarily to clarify the legal status of Japan’s present-day military forces. But it is inconceivable that they will undo the principles of popular sovereignty and extensive guarantee of democracy rights. And, in one way or another, whatever revision takes place, we should expect to see reaffirmation of the fundamental ideals of antimilitarism.

I have no doubt that huge numbers of Iraqis would welcome the end of repression and establishment of a democratic society, but any number of considerations make the situation there very different than it was in Japan. Apart from lacking the moral legitimacy and internal and global support that buttressed its occupation of Japan, the United States is not in the business of nation-building any more—just look at Afghanistan. And we certainly are not in the business of promoting radical democratic reform. Even liberal ideals are anathema in the conservative circles that shape U.S. policy today. And beyond this, many of the conditions that contributed to the success of the occupation of Japan are simply absent in Iraq.

What, more precisely, were the unique conditions that contributed to success in Japan—particularly those that would be absent in Iraq?

John Stuart Mill has a wonderful line somewhere to the effect that a country can be laid waste by fire and sword, but in and of itself this really doesn’t matter where recovery is concerned. What matters is not so much what is destroyed but rather what human resources survive. Even though Japan had been laid to ruin by the terror-bombing of its cities, what survived was an exceptionally literate populace whose long war effort had, in fact, contributed to great and widespread advances in technological and technocratic skills. At the same time this was an essentially homogeneous populace that had been mobilized behind a common national cause.

The failure and discredit of the cause did not destroy this general sense of collective national purpose. It meant, however, that these great human resources were available to be mobilized to new ends that were more peaceful and progressive. Put simply, one of the reasons the reformist agenda succeeded is that Japan was spared the type of fierce tribal, religious, and political factionalism that exists in countries like Iraq today.

Particularly in the early stages of effecting a smooth surrender Japan also possessed an unusually flexible—some would say chameleonlike—leader in the person of Emperor Hirohito. The emperor had certainly been the symbol of presurrender militarism, and no innocent bystander to wartime policymaking. He was not, however, a hands-on dictator akin to Hitler or Mussolini—or to Saddam Hussein. Once surrender became unavoidable the emperor adroitly metamorphosed into a symbol of cooperation with the conquerors. He came quietly, and for reasons of pure expediency the Americans happily whitewashed and welcomed him. He became, as it were, a beacon of continuity in the midst of drastic change. We cannot, of course, imagine anything of the sort taking place in a post-hostilities Iraq.

Much the same sort of continuity took place at the levels of both national and local government. Certain important reforms were introduced at the national level—most notably the abolition of the War (army) and Navy ministries and the breakup and gutting of the once-powerful Home Ministry, which had controlled the police and dictated policies at the level of the prefectures or states. But for all practical purposes the bureaucracy remained intact, top to bottom. And to a far greater extent than anyone really anticipated, bureaucrats and civil servants cooperated in implementing the early reformist agendas. “Democratization” of the structure and content of the educational system, to take but one example, required and received enormous input from bureaucrats and teachers at every level. The skills and education levels of the Iraqi people are substantial, but it is nonetheless difficult to imagine a comparably swift, smooth, and substantial redirection of existing administrative and institutional structures in a post-hostilities Iraq.

We should also keep in mind what defeated Japan did not possess. Japan is notoriously poor in natural resources. A desperate quest for control of raw materials as well as markets was one of the major considerations that drove Japanese imperialism and aggression in the first place. That, after all, is why the emperor’s men deemed it necessary to invade Southeast Asia and—once that decision had been made—attempted to forestall American retaliation by launching a preemptive strike at the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor. In the wake of Japan’s shattering defeat, no one ever imagined that it would ever again become a major power; and there were no resources within Japan itself to covet. And so the reformers—Americans and Japanese alike—had a brief breathing space in which to push their ambitious agendas without being hammered by special economic interests. Iraq, of course, with its great oil resources, will not be spared such interference.

What lessons can we draw from that earlier war and occupation and the world we fact today?

The occupation of Japan offers no model whatsoever for any projected occupation of Iraq. On the contrary, it should stand as a warning that we are lurching toward war with no idea of what we are really getting into. What is presented as hard-nosed realism by the advocates of a preemptive strike against Iraq is really—what? I have concluded after much thought that our so-called realism is simply a terrible hubris.

But to an historian of the United States and Japan and World War II there are also terrible ironies in these recent developments. Part of the irony is that Americans—certainly Americans in the current administration—have no sense of irony. “September 11” has become our terrible new “Pearl Harbor,” and at the very same time we are touting “preemptive strikes” as a moral and practical modus operandi. In the name of curbing weapons of mass destruction we have embarked on a massive program of producing new arsenals of mass destruction and have announced that we may resort to first-use of nuclear weapons. We express moral repulsion and horror at the terror-bombing of civilians, and rightly so; and then an endless stream of politicians and pundits explains how this is peculiar to Islamic fundamentalists who do not value human life as we do. But “terror-bombing” has been everyone’s game since World War II. This is the term historians routinely use to describe the U.S. bombing campaign against Japan that began with the destruction, in a single air raid, of fourteen square miles of downtown Tokyo in March 1945 and continued through Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is nothing cultural or religious or unique about this.

There is one “lesson” from my own field of Japanese history that I find increasingly difficult to put out of mind these days, and that concerns the road to war that began in the early 1930s for Japan and only ended in 1945. Until recently, historians used to explain this disaster in terms of Japan’s “backwardness” and “semifeudal” nature. The country had all these old warrior traditions. It wasn’t a democracy—and, of course, democracies don’t wage aggressive war. More recent studies, however, cast Japan’s road to war in a different and more terrifying light.

Why “terrifying”? First, much recent scholarship suggests that it was the modern rather than “backward” aspects of Japanese society and culture that enabled a hawkish leadership to mobilize the country for all-out war. Modern mass communications enabled politicians and ideologues to whip up war sentiment and castigate those who criticized the move to war as traitors. Modern concerns about external markets and resources drove Japan into Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia. Modern weaponry carried its own technological imperatives. Top-level planners advanced up-to-date theories about mobilizing the entire resources of the country (and surrounding areas) for “total war.” Sophisticated phrasemakers pumped out propaganda about defending the homeland and promoting “coexistence and co-prosperity” throughout Asia. Cultures of violence, cultures of militarism, cultures of unquestioning obedience to supreme authority in the face of national crisis—all of this was nurtured by sophisticated organs of propaganda and control. And, in retrospect, none of this seems peculiarly dated or peculiarly “Japanese” today.

The other aspect that is so terrifying to contemplate is that virtually every step of the way, the Japanese leaders who concluded that military solutions had become unavoidable were very smart and very proud of their technical expertise, their special knowledge, their unsentimental “realism” in a threatening world. Many of these planners were, in our own phrase, “the best and the brightest.” We have detailed records of their deliberations and planning papers, and most are couched in highly rational terms. Each new escalation, each new extension of the empire, was deemed essential to the national interest. And even in retrospect, it is difficult to say at what point this so-called realism crossed the border into madness. But it was, in the end, madness.

This interview was originally published in the February/March 2003 issue of Boston Review but with the questions omitted.

John W. Dower is Elting E. Morison Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His recent book, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, won numerous awards including the Pulitzer Prize, the National Book Award, and the Bancroft Prize.

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Friday, March 14, 2003

-INDYMEDIA

TOKYOPROGRESSIVE will be on vaction for the next 3 weeks. BUT, IndyMedia JApan
is now working on a trial basis, so please visit. We will be working closely with them, being part of the IndyMedia Japan collective.

You can write articles there as well.

Take care, and please help stop the war from starting. If it does, do not despair. It depends on us to stop it, as we did during the Vietnam war. Protest must continue.

IndyMedia Japan

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Thursday, March 06, 2003

- US, Iraq, Korea, Japan and nuclear weapons

by Joseph Gerson

..... I want to invoke the memory of the courageous Hibakusha Watanabe Chieko, Years ago she drew from her own incalculable suffering to inveigh against U.S. bombings and nuclear threats against Vietnam. Yes, we want the people of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran to enjoy freedom. We want that for the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean people as well....

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=51&ItemID=3155

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13:00 Open
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15:30 Parade Start (across Ginza)
Place: The Large Outdoor Music Hall in Hibiya Park, TOKYO
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ENGLISH
http://give-peace-a-chance.jp/e38/index.htm

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DISCUSSION: ‚±‚ê‚©‚ç‚Ì•½˜aŠˆ“®/Where does the peace movement go?

Add your peace actions here

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- Japan and North Korea

by David Blake Willis

http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0226-02.htm

Published on Wednesday, February 26, 2003 by CommonDreams.org

Looking into Pandora’s Box: Notes from Japan on Ground Zero

Pandora’s Box has been opened in Northeast Asia, and possibly the world, as the bellicose rhetoric and saber-rattling posturing of the United States, North Korea, and others has awakened fears in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan about possible scenarios of either US hyper-engagement or hyper-withdrawal and the need for “self-defense”.

These nations, it should be widely known, sit on top of large stockpiles of plutonium. The Japanese Self-Defense forces Director announced loudly in the international press last week that Japan reserves the right to pre-emptive strikes against North Korea. This is Japan talking, not the United States, about pre-emptive strikes. South Korea meanwhile, with the inauguration of their new President Roh Moo-hyun appears cool to the idea of any military action and distancing itself from the US. Taiwan cannot be far behind in its nervousness about the turn of events.

The evident beginning of the collapse of a formerly stable security system in Northeast Asia in such a short time is nothing short of stunning. The possible continuing sequence of events leaves little to the imagination:

Ground Zero all over again. Maybe many Ground Zeroes.

I write from Western Japan, from Kobe, the city devastated by an earthquake in 1995, and near Kyoto, the city saved from atomic bombing during World War II. It is not a comfortable place to be sitting in these cold winter months of 2003. Like the North Koreans, who suffer from lack of even basic heat or electricity, we are sitting here uncomfortably watching the unfolding horrors in the Middle East, filled with feelings of dread that we are next. This part of the world has seen many catastrophes in the past hundred years, but none of them will compare with the fragmentation of nations in Northeast Asia and the spread of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems that seems to have started here.

The Japanese Defense Agency today withheld even basic information from the civilian government about the latest missile launching for many hours, the national news reporting here that it was some time before the Prime Minister and other key figures were notified, many by the media apparently. Explanations from the Self-Defense Agency looked dissembling and seemed to be intentionally vague. What is disturbing is the pattern of closely held communication and secrecy. Curiously, too, few Japanese were aware of the Defense Agency Director’s threat of a pre-emptive strike on North Korea.

Although the story had big international airplay, it was not widely reported in Japan. Draw your own conclusions.

The steady drum-beat of the horrifying stories of Japanese people kidnapped by North Koreans over the years since the release of a group of them recently has at the same time raised the anger level to just the right pitch to justify military action. Discussion of the revision of the constitution and elimination of Article 9 (the so-called Peace Article, which mandates Japan forever from using war as an instrument of diplomacy) so that Japan can protect itself from outrages such as the abductions and other potential missile launchings from North Korea has spread, stoking the passions of right-wing nationalists.

In these troubled times, it might be appropriate to consider more carefully what the expression Ground Zero means, especially as events are escalating towards flashpoint. Originally a metaphor for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Ground Zero was co-opted by the events of 9/11 as the symbol of modern tragedy and righteous anger.

Immediately after the World Trade Center attacks in 2001, Pearl Harbor was the phrase on many people’s lips, a surprise attack that changed history. Pearl Harbor had devastated America’s image of comfortable isolation from the tempo of the rest of the world. Now it was happening again. Pearl Harbor, for Americans at least, stood apart from what had been happening:

“We were innocent and they were evil,” according to Americans.

Japanese-Americans and others were quick to jump on the use of Pearl Harbor in 2001 in the week after 9/11 as bearing another legacy, one of racism, abuse, and concentration camps. Then a strange period of namelessness emerged as we all tried to grope with what had happened in New York. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) began happening in disturbing and unpredictable ways. The image of a surprise attack has lingered, but the key phrase everyone gradually settled on was Ground Zero.

There is a serious danger, however, in simply using the term Ground Zero without a deep understanding of its historical precedents. The power of Ground Zero comes to this: it is the most powerful of all symbols of man’s inhumanity to man. We should continually remind ourselves that Ground Zero in its original context was the earth-shaking oblivion visited upon the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and, ultimately, humanity.

“You cannot understand the 20th century without Hiroshima,” said Robert Jay Lifton, one of the most profound authors of our time. The top news story of the 20th century, Hiroshima as Ground Zero should be remembered and considered as we appear to be headed for another reckless adventure of death and destruction. The stark images from the World Trade Center ruins evoke the A-Bomb Dome in Hiroshima. Ground Zero evokes our mortality as a species.

Hiroshima? “We were innocent and they were evil.” “They deserved what they got.” “If we hadn’t done it a million lives would have been lost.” “Pre-emptive strike.” These rationales pale by comparison with the catastrophic wreckage wrought on our collective psyches as humans by Hiroshima. What will happen next?

The shocking speed with which the world has been altered should give us pause as we consider what to do next. Like Philip Morrison, one of the early scientists with the Manhattan Project (the name resonates peculiarly today), many of those who bore direct witness to Hiroshima and Ground Zero in the scientific survey of that city in September 1945 saw what happened as “a crime and a sin.” Not because of the hotly-contested decision whether to use the bomb or not, but because it was “the first event of a future that’s intolerable.” Ground Zero was/is a token of what lies in the future.

At Ground Zero in New York City there are thousands of gifts of remembrance and tribute. Among them are the gifts of hundreds of children: folded paper birds of peace: Cranes, doves, and yes, eagles. We need to keep uppermost in our minds what Jimmy Carter said in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, that we cannot change the world for the better by killing each other?fs children.

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?@?iƒXƒ^ƒbƒt‚�?ŽQ‰�?�?ï–³—¿?j
?@ŽQ‰�?ŽÒ‚Æ‚¢‚�?‚µ‚å‚É‚Â‚‚éƒvƒ?ƒOƒ‰ƒ€‚Å‚·?B

Printable Version

- ‘æ‚R‰ñ?…ƒtƒH?[ƒ‰ƒ€ Water Forum

Join our Direct Action against Privatization of Water

The 3rd World Water Forum will be held in Kyoto, Osaka and Shiga from March 16th to 23rd. A SEED JAPAN was launched the Stolen Water Campaign on Dec 6th 2002. We are focusing on the privatization of water services promoted by International Financial Institutions such as World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank. We are going to take a creative direct action against privatization of water services on 21st March. The detail of our direct action has been considered. We hope you will join our campaign, and join our
action to make fair water!

‘æ‚R‰ñ?…ƒtƒH?[ƒ‰ƒ€‚ª‚RŒŽ16“ú‚©‚ç23“ú‚Ü‚Å?¡“ú‚Æ‚É‚ÄŠJ?Ã‚³‚ê‚Ü‚·?BA SEED JAPAN ‚�?2002�?N12ŒŽ6“ú‚©‚ç?u’D‚í‚ê‚µ?…ƒLƒƒƒ“ƒy?[ƒ“?v?„?i‚µ‚Ä‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½?B?¢ŠE‹â?s?AIMF ‚âƒAƒWƒAŠJ�?‹â?s‚Æ‚¢‚�?‚½?‘?Û‹à—Z‹@ŠÖ‚ª‚·‚·‚ß‚é?…“¹ƒT?[ƒrƒX‚Ì–¯‰c‰»‚É?Å“_‚ð“– ‚Ä‚Ü‚·?B3ŒŽ21“ú‚É‚±‚¤‚µ‚½?…“¹ƒT?[ƒrƒX‚Ì–¯‰c‰»‚É�?½‘Î‚·‚é‚½‚ß‚Ì’¼?Ú?s“®‚ð?s‚¢‚Ü‚·?B?Ú?×“™‚�?‚·‚Å‚ÉŒŸ“¢‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚Ì‚Å?AŠF—l‚àŽ„‚½‚¿‚ÌƒLƒƒƒ“ƒy?[ƒ“‚ÉŽQ‰�?‚µ?A
?…–â‘è‚Ì‰ðŒˆ‚É?vŒ£‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚å‚¤?I

for more info:
A SEED JAPAN
5-4-23 Shinjuku,Shinjuku ku, Tokyo, 160-0022 JAPAN
Tel:+81-3-5366-7484
Fax:+81-3-3341-6030
e-mail:asj@jca.apc.org
URL:http://www.aseed.org/

REFERENCE
Water justice in Kyoto?
http://tokyoprogressive.org/news/tpnews_comments.php?id=P134_0_2_0_C

‹ž“s‰ï‹c‚É?…‚Ì?³‹`?iWater?@Justice?j‚�?‚ ‚è‚¤‚é‚©?H
http://tokyoprogressive.org/news/tpnews_comments.php?id=P136_0_2_0_C

World Water Forum promotes privatisation and deregulation of world’s water
--from Corporate Europe Observer - Issue 7
http://arenson.racknine.net/2002_09_03_tokyoprog_archive.html#85406381

?¢ŠE?…ƒtƒH?[ƒ‰ƒ€Žs–¯ƒlƒbƒgƒ??[ƒN
http://www.jca.apc.org/%7Epfw/

WATER ?…
http://www.mnet.ne.jp/%7Ebjsmall/sub1.htm

The BAD guys (more or less):
http://www.worldwaterforum.org/

Also this:
Why Does the WTO Want My Water?
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0305-02.htm

Printable Version

-“ú–{•½˜a±¸¼®�?/Peace Action Japan March-April 2003

Can we stop the war before it starts? What do we do if it DOES start? Demonstrate? Civil Disobedience? How to raise the cost to the warmakers? How to save lives? How to create a world of peace, of social and economic justice?

DISCUSSION: ‚±‚ê‚©‚ç‚Ì•½˜aŠˆ“®/Where does the peace movement go?

Here are some important links:

Actions

Add your peace actions here

Peace Calendar

PREEMPTIVE NONVIOLENCE NOW:sit-ins, blockades....

Anti-War Petition/“–?«‚È‚«•Ä?‘‚ÌƒCƒ‰ƒN?UŒ‚‚Ö‚Ì“ú–{?•{‚ÌŽÀŽ¿“IŽxŽ?‚Ì“P‰ñ—v?¿

Confronting the War Machine-April 5-6 2003: Citizens weapons inspections, nonviolent actions....

Emergency Petition to the Security Council

An Appeal from Dr. Helen Caldicott to the Pope (Petition)

Debate
Mobilize For The Next Phase: Dominick and Azulay
Where do we go from here: Michael Albert

Printable Version

Thursday, February 27, 2003

- Zƒlƒbƒg?V’…?î•ñ [24.Feb.2003]

-----------------------------
‚²‚ ‚¢‚³‚Â?F

‚à‚Ì‚·‚²‚¢•s’èŠú‚Å‚·‚ª?AƒT?[ƒo‚ðˆÚ“®‚µ‚½‚¤‚¦‚É?Aƒtƒ@ƒCƒ‹‚ð
‚½‚‚³‚ñ’Ç‰�?‚µ‚½‚Ì‚Å?A‘?‚¢‚¤‚¿‚É 005?†‚ð?o‚µ‚Ä‚¨‚«‚Ü‚·?B

?VƒT?[ƒo‚ÌƒAƒhƒŒƒX‚�??AZƒlƒbƒg‚ª http://rootless.org/z
ƒ`ƒ‡ƒ€ƒXƒL?[ƒA?[ƒJƒCƒ�?‚ª http://rootless.org/chomsky
‚Æ‚È‚è‚Ü‚·?B?¡Œã‚Æ‚à‹X‚µ‚‚¨Šè‚¢‚µ‚Ü‚·?B

-----------------------------
?V’…?E?X?V?î•ñ?F

Zƒlƒbƒg?•ƒ`ƒ‡ƒ€ƒXƒL?[?EƒA?[ƒJƒCƒ�?“ú–{Œê�?Å‚Ì?V’…?î•ñ

----
ƒ`ƒ‡ƒ€ƒXƒL?[ [ƒCƒ‰ƒN‚Æƒgƒ‹ƒR]
http://rootless.org/chomsky/#kurd

ƒCƒ“ƒ^ƒrƒ…?[?FƒCƒ‰ƒN?UŒ‚‚É‚Â‚¢‚Ä, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 23.Feb.2003 NEW!
ƒAƒ?ƒŠƒJƒ“?EƒAƒJƒfƒ~ƒbƒN‚ª�?á�?»‚·‚é?A•Ä?‘‚ÌƒCƒ‰ƒN??ô, Ž›“‡—²‹g?{‹L?†Œ¤, 23.Feb.2001
“American Academic Criticizes US Policy on Iraq”, monkeyfist.com,14.Feb.2003

* ‚Ù‚Ú“¯Žž‚É“ñŽí—Þ‚Ì–|–ó‚ª“�?‚«‚Ü‚µ‚½?B‰v‰ª‚³‚ñ‚ªƒRƒ?ƒ“ƒg
‚µ‚Ä‚¢‚é‚æ‚¤‚É?A“ú–{?l‚Æ‚µ‚Ä‚�??A?u1933�?N2ŒŽ24“ú‚É?‘?Û˜A–¿
‚ð’E‘Þ‚µ?A?‘?Û˜A–¿‚Ì‹c?ê‚ð‚³‚é?¼‰ª‘SŒ ‘åŽg?v‚ðŽv‚¢?o‚µ‚Ü‚·?B

ƒCƒ‰ƒN?UŒ‚‚ð‚ß‚®‚é“¢˜_, Ž›“‡—²‹g?{‹L?†Œ¤, 21.Feb.2003 NEW!
“The Iraq Debate”, OxfordStudent, 13.Feb.2003

* •Ä?‘‚�??¢ŠE‚ð‚Ç‚±‚É“±‚‚©?A‰ä?X‚�??í‘ˆ‚�?‘jŽ~‚Å‚«‚é‚©

----
ƒCƒ‰ƒN?UŒ‚?FƒpƒEƒGƒ‹‚Ì?u?Ø‹’?v
http://rootless.org/z/#powell

?í‘ˆ‚Å‚�?‚È‚, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 18.Feb.2003 NEW!
“ Instead of War “, Justin Podur, 16.Feb.2003

* ?ÂŽR’åˆê‚³‚ñ‚É‚æ‚é?u?³“–?«‚È‚«•Ä?‘‚ÌƒCƒ‰ƒN?UŒ‚?v‚àŽQ?l‚É
http://www.01.246.ne.jp/~aoyama/newyearcolum1.html

--
?uƒRƒ?ƒ“ƒrƒA?vƒR?[ƒi?[?V?�?
http://rootless.org/z/#columbia

* ‰v‰ª‚³‚ñ‚Ì?uƒRƒ?ƒ“ƒrƒA“�??W?v‚©‚ç Zƒlƒbƒg‚Ì‹LŽ–‚ð?®—?‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚½?B
http://www.jca.apc.org/~kmasuoka/places/colombia.html

ƒRƒ?ƒ“ƒrƒA“ü–å‚p?•‚`, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 06.May.2002
“Colombia Primer” Q & A on the conflict and US Role, Doug Stokes, 16.Apr.2002

ƒRƒ?ƒ“ƒrƒA‚Ì?€ŒR‘g?D?FŒ˜ŒÅ‚Èƒeƒ??Eƒlƒbƒgƒ??[ƒN‚Ì?Ñ‘œ, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 12.May.2002
“ Colombia’s Paramilitary” Profile of an Entrenched Terror Network, Adam Weiss, 22.Apr.2002

ƒRƒ?ƒ“ƒrƒA‚ÉŠÖ‚·‚é•Ä?‘‚Ì�?FŽ¯‘€?ì‚Æ?u‘Îƒeƒ??í‘ˆ?v, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 12.Aug.2002
“ Perception Management and the US Terror War in Colombia “, Doug Stokes, 07.Jun.2002

ƒRƒ?ƒ“ƒrƒA‚ÌƒoƒCƒI?Eƒeƒ??FƒAƒ“ƒfƒX’nˆæ‚Ö‚ÌƒG?[ƒWƒFƒ“ƒg?EƒOƒŠ?[ƒ“, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 18.Jan.2003
“Drug War According to Mengele” Agent Green over the Andes, Jeffrey St.Clair, 31.Dec.2002

ƒpƒ„?F‚S–¼‚ªŽE‚³‚ê‚é, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 28.Jan.2003
“ Fear And Pain In Paya, Attack Leaves Four Dead” Indigenous Leaders Assasinated, Jose Otero, 23.Jan.2003

ƒ‚?[ƒjƒ“ƒO?EƒR?[ƒ‹, ‰v‰ªŒ«, 23.Feb.2003
“Wakeup Call”, Andy Higginbottom, 10.Feb.2003

-----------------------------
?‘?�?ˆÄ“à?F

--
ƒfƒCƒ�?ƒBƒbƒh?Eƒo?[ƒTƒ~ƒAƒ“ ƒCƒ“ƒ^ƒrƒ…?[, ‘å‹´—mˆê ‘¼–ó
?w’é?‘‚Æ‚Ì‘ÎŒˆ ƒCƒNƒo?[ƒ‹?EƒAƒtƒ}ƒh�?Œ¾?W?x(‘¾“c?o�?Å)
http://www.bk1.co.jp/cgi-bin/srch/srch_detail.cgi/?aid=p-akubi0034&bibid=02277438&volno=0000

* ƒCƒNƒo?[ƒ‹?EƒAƒtƒ}ƒh‚É‚Â‚¢‚Ä‚�??Aƒyƒ‹ƒ�?ƒFƒY?Eƒt?[ƒhƒ{?[ƒC‚É‚æ‚é
’Ç“‰•¶‚ª?Aƒ`ƒ‡ƒ€ƒXƒL?[‚âƒTƒC?[ƒh‚ç‚Æ‚ÌŒð—FŠÖŒW‚ð’m‚é?ã‚Å‚½‚¢‚Ö‚ñ
ŽQ?l‚É‚È‚è‚Ü‚·?B“c?è?°–¾‚³‚ñ‚É‚æ‚é–|–ó‚ð?A‚Ç‚¤‚¼?F
http://www.gakushuin.ac.jp/~881791/hoodbhoy/index-j.html#Eqbal

--
ƒm?[ƒ€?Eƒ`ƒ‡ƒ€ƒXƒL?[’˜ Šp“cŽj?K?E“c’†?l –ó
?w?V?¢‘ã‚�?ˆê?ü‚ð‰æ‚·?x(‚±‚Ô‚µ?‘–[)
http://www.kobushi-shobo.co.jp/foramu/foramu.htm#kf7
http://www.bk1.co.jp/cgi-bin/srch/srch_detail.cgi/?aid=p-akubi0034&bibid=02280765&volno=0000

* –|–ó‚ª‘±?X‚Æ?o�?Å‚³‚ê‚Ä‚¢‚é‚»‚¤‚Å‚·‚ª?A‚»‚Ì‚È‚©‚©‚ç‚±‚Ìˆê?û‚ð?B
ƒ†?[ƒS‹ó�?š‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚ðŽv‚¢?o‚µ‚Ü‚µ‚å‚¤?BƒuƒbƒVƒ…(•ƒ)‚ª“–ŽžŒ–“`‚µ‚½
?u?V?¢ŠE’??˜?v‚ª‚È‚ñ‚¾‚�?‚½‚Ì‚©‰ü‚ß‚Ä?l‚¦’¼‚µ‚Ä‚�?‚Ü‚µ‚å‚¤?B

[?‘?Û?î?¨] ‚É‚à?A“–Žž‚Ìƒ`ƒ‡ƒ€ƒXƒL?[‚Ì?lŽ@‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·?B
http://rootless.org/chomsky/#foreign

Œ»‰º‚Ì�?šŒ‚ ƒŒƒgƒŠƒbƒN‚Ì�?wŒã‚É?ö‚Þ‚à‚Ì, Ž›“‡—²‹g
ƒ†?[ƒS‹ó�?š‚É‚Â‚¢‚Ä, ‹g?ì—Eˆê
“The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric”, ZNet, --.Mar.1999

-----------------------------
‚ ‚Æ‚ª‚«?F

ƒ}ƒhƒ‰?o�?Å‚ÌŒŽŠ§Ž??w?L??�?á•]?x‚Å?u�?ñWAR?v‚Æ‘è‚µ‚½“�??W‚ª‘g‚Ü‚ê‚é
‚»‚¤‚Å‚·?Bƒ`ƒ‡ƒ€ƒXƒL?[‚Ì‚±‚Æ‚à?�?‰î‚·‚é‚Æ‚Ì‚±‚Æ?BŠy‚µ‚�?‚É‚Ç‚¤‚¼?B

Printable Version

-Japan and Asia: Introducing JAPAN FOCUS

Japan Focus introduces writings about Japan and Japan in the world, primarily by Japanese authors. The emphasis is on issues of war/peace/terror, and on social conflicts and social movements.

They are found on this ZNet page:

http://www.zmag.org/asiawatch/asiawatch.htm

-The 2002 Defense Ministry White Paper: Full speed ahead to the national warfare state

by Hisao Maeda

Former Defense Ministry analyst Maeda Hisao warns of the emergence of a national warfare state and the further decimation of the provisions of Japan’s peace constitution. He targets for criticism two Koizumi administration documents: The Defense White Paper of summer 2002 and the War Contingency Bills currently tabled for debate in the legislature. Maeda critiques the transformation of Japan’s “self-defense” policy into one of aggressive “pre-emptive defense” as its defense perimeter is extended far beyond the Japanese islands. In contrast to the careful legislative analysis of Maeda Tetsuo (also available at Japan Focus), this manifesto by a former military establishment insider offers a blunt criticism of Japanese leaders. While warning of the consequences of an aggressive Japanese defense posture, the author, like a number of other SDF insiders, is equally critical of the consequences of the usurpation of the autonomy of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, that is, its subordination to American global military designs. From Gunshuku (Disarmament) in November, 2002.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The second Defense White Paper (hereafter WP) of the Koizumi administration was announced at a cabinet meeting on 1 August. Originally scheduled for early July its appearance coincided with the end of the legislative term as the three bills known together as the “War Contingency Bills” were introduced; the debate has been postponed to a later session. This year’s WP is in five parts with a budget, bibliography, and glossary. The chapters are as follows: 1) The International Military Situation 2) Our Country’s Self-Defense Policy 3) National Sudden Response and Facilities of the US-Japan Alliance 4) Disaster Response and Contributions to a More Stable Environment and 5) The Populace and Self-Defense.

I. 9.11 and the War Against Terrorism

9.11 In Context This year’s WP begins with last year’s terrorist attack on the US. It describes the attack as an “unforgivable act of terrorism” and “a challenge to the democracy, peace, and freedom of the international community, including our country.” However, this statement is somewhat questionable since the attack clearly targeted the US, and the WP does not attempt to explain the rather vague concept of “international community” nor even question why the US might have been the target. The terminology simply mimics US policy statements, the logical conclusion being that any US military campaign is a “just war.”

A Makeover of the US Afghan Campaign The WP blindly gilds the attack on Afghanistan as “led by cutting-edge military technology.” The effectiveness of cruelly destructive weaponry such as “cluster bombs” and “daisy cutters” are highlighted in special descriptive columns, and the US military is further elevated for its “specially guided weapons that minimize civilian casualties,” although all told the civilian casualties may outnumber those who died in the 9.11 attacks. Furthermore the first paragraph of the WP proudly puffs that Japan’s own anti-terrorism legislation, applauded by Washington for allowing the dispatch of re-fueling ships [Translator’s note: and currently the Aegis radar ship] to the Indian Ocean “was supported by the majority of the citizenry as a fulfillment of international responsibility.” It is anathema to criticize the conflict as a US “dirty war.”

II. The Military in the Asia Pacific Region

Unclear and Unresolved 9.11 notwithstanding, analysis in the present WP of regional affairs shows little change from last year’s report, which is to say that the end of the Cold War has brought no change in security arrangements with large-scale military forces including nuclear armed contingents, remaining the order of the day. In addition, economic growth has led to increased defense expenditures and modernization of the military. Other countries in the region have given China special consideration as an economic and political super-power. The showdown between North and South Korea continues unabated despite the meeting between Secretary Kim Jong Il and President Kim Dae Jung, and closer to home Japan’s competing claims with Russia over the islands north of Hokkaidô, Takejima/Dok-do islands with South Korea, and the Spratly Islands with China remain unresolved. In short, the region is anything but stable and there is a pressing need for peaceful resolution. In the worst-case scenario, full-scale war on the Korean peninsula remains a possibility.

Given this situation, the WP asserts, “The allied and friendly relations between Japan and the US are the basis for US military presence in the region that provides safety and stability.” This statement is made without touching on the fact that since 9.11 the US has branded Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil” and maintains a posture that does not preclude pre-emptive strikes, opening the possibility for Japan to be drawn into a US-led conflict.

North Korea According to the WP, North Korea, in addition to developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction and guided missiles, maintains a 100,000-strong special-forces contingent active in all forms of activity from espionage and sabotage to guerilla warfare. Therefore, “DPRK action raises the level of military tension on the peninsula and is also the main agent of instability in the entire East Asian region.” “The DPRK continues R&D on long-range missiles,” the WP continues, and the Nodong, with a range of 1300 km capable of reaching Japanese territory, has already been perfected. There are also orders to deploy Taepodong #2 with a range of 3500-6000 km, greater than the 1500 km Taepodong #1 which over-flew northern Japan three years ago. A two-stage Taepodong #2 could reach Alaska and an improved three-stage version could also possibly reach the US mainland, the WP states ominously.

The Russian Far East “Since its peak period the number of Russian forces has been reduced substantially,” with a scaling back of funding, training exercises, and the number of ground troops “limited to a special-response unit”. The WP attributes these changes to the disarray and contraction of the Russian economy, a relaxation of military tension with the US, the reduced necessity of showing military strength in the Far East, and an easing of tensions with China. It concludes, “In the foreseeable future there is little possibility of the Russian Army returning to the posture of the Cold War Soviet era,” but all the while contends, “There is still reason for caution.” With ground troop deployments reduced from roughly 400,000 to 110,000, available naval detachments of 1,500,000 tons to 800,000 tons, and the air force reduced to one-third its former strength (2,000 to 680 aircraft), the WP sees the present Far Eastern Russian Army drastically reduced in strength compared with just ten years previous.

III. “The China Threat” Theory

Increased Defense Spending The WP suggests that Chinese defense spending has increased 10% a year in the 14 years since 1989 and this fiscal year shows a large 17.6% jump, but the budget figures made public by Beijing are only a small part of total expenditures for the armed forces. Additionally, the fiscal review reported in the National People’s Congress notes increased expenditures for “modern technology, especially to strengthen high-tech defense capability.”

Comparisons With Other Countries The WP provides statistics compiled by the UK International Institute for Strategic Studies entitled “Changes in Defense Spending”. China’s expenditure was $41.2 billion, in fact 8% less than Japan’s $44.4 billion. Japan ranked third behind the US ($294.7 billion) and Russia ($58.8 billion). China was fourth, ahead of France ($34.3 billion), the UK ($33.9 billion), and Germany ($28.2 billion).
Fear of the Modernization of the Chinese Military Concerning China’s nuclear capability, in addition to the estimated 20 ICBMs concerning which last year’s WP asserted “the whole of Asia including Japan falls within their range”, are the medium-range missiles. Last year’s figure of 100, disputed by China, has been updated to 130-150, plus an entry for the first time of 335 short-range missiles, suggesting a buildup in the Taiwan straits. The WP offers the following analysis concerning land, sea, and air power. Since 1985 with an eye on modernization there have been attempts to reduce manpower and to heighten the effectiveness of various systems, reorganize the infantry by uniting various units, and attempts to create quick-response special forces with great mobility. The navy has been transformed from a force to protect coastal areas to one that can protect coastal waters from long distance. In air power there has been concerted progress in the licensed production of Russian fighter planes, acquisition of in-flight re-fueling systems, an early-warning system, and guided missile system development.

Summarizing, the WP issues the following warning: Modernization of China’s armed forces extends beyond defense. It portends a wider scale of action and bears close watch in the future. To my mind, however, this conclusion alludes to the sort of military view of the world that Japan has supposedly foresworn with its disavowal of war as an instrument of foreign policy.

IV. The Imperial Army Mentality of the Current Defense Ministry

Fantasies of victimhood in the name of peace and security Thus the WP offers the following conclusion: “To self-reliantly maintain our country’s peace and independence in the present international milieu necessitates a defensive posture that assures response to all varieties of military action from nuclear devices to threats of invasion.” However, in addition to being economically unfeasible, building such an infrastructure is not an appropriate political stance for Japan. I would emphasize that such statements must include the following: “A posture is required that meets our legitimate defense needs, one that is functional in light of the bilateral relationship with the US which possesses a huge military force and with whom we have deep economic ties, one that maintains our concerns for peace and stability in the region, and is grounded in democratic values that respect human rights and freedoms.”

Viewing a world at war The WP, evoking images of “survival of the fittest,” asserts that, given the opportunity, “evil invaders” are “prepared to pounce at any time.” If this is the world view of the defense establishment, Japan would necessarily have to become a heavily armed and fortified country. “The last line of a country’s stability is its defensive capability, and nothing else can take over this function”; “defense capability” should be read as “military power.” One would think that the lesson learned from defeat in the last war is that a country that becomes lost in it’s own prioritization of military power can only bring harm to its citizenry.

Japan and the US as different countries To go on about how Japan and the US “have the same values” smacks of fantasy. While both spout similar phrases of “freedom, democracy, and human rights” they pursue these ideals in entirely different ways. What characterizes the US approach is the view that these ideals, under the auspices of American power, are fundamentally for the greater good and must be pressed upon other countries. Japan has, on the basis of its constitution, renounced war and armed conflict and the possession of a military force. The US on the other hand, to fulfill its ambitions, boasts the most powerful military force in the world and can use nuclear weapons at a whim. It is a country that still defends the justice of the atomic attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and proclaims the Vietnam War a “just war.” Can we say that it has “the same values” as Japan? Our country will surely encounter danger if we ally too closely.

V. Toward the “Warfare State”

The US-Japan Security Pact (AMPO) as the core of the problem. The WP declares that Japan and the US “both are committed to working together to maintain the peace and stability of the Far East.” It is talk that does not appear to be borne out in current circumstances. To that end, the US has employed arms to control the region, inspiring China, the DPRK, and Russia to defend their own interests, making a kind of military diplomacy the order of the day. Entering into an alliance with such a country will mean being embroiled in possible conflagration. Japan has come to be targeted by Chinese and DPRK missiles because this country provides a foothold for the US in the region and is the whipping boy for the support it provides.

The regional situation and collective self-defense Japan continues to draw itself deeper into US global military stratagems. The so-called “New Guidelines” for “US-Japan Defense Cooperation” in 1997 dictated “military cooperation to meet situations in the region”, a change from the old 1978 agreement mandating cooperation only if Japan itself were attacked. The New Guidelines establish the parameters of Japan’s cooperation were the US to launch an attack from Japan. They provide the basis for the three pieces of legislation known as the “Regional Security Preservation Law” passed in May 1999. But “regional” remains undefined. Neither is clarification offered for “situations that strongly influence the peace and stability of the territory of our country.” And yet it is taken as a given that the SDF will support foreign armies throughout the region whereas previously self-defense justified its existence. Therefore we don’t know to what extent the “support” concept will be appplied. Although support will ostensibly be limited to “non-combat zones”, under present wartime conditions there is little differentiation between “front lines” and “rear support.” Without a doubt the real meaning of “collective self-defense” is that Japan will support US troops throughout the region beyond Japan even when the country itself is not under attack.

In a statement following the 9.11 attack, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro stated that the government “was singularly committed to and aware that fighting terrorism is the preservation of peace for our country,” and introduced an anti-terrorism bill in October 2001 that became law that month. A provision provided the condition that Self-Defense Forces “would not enter combat areas, nor was there any fear of doing so.” Following the US lead, however, material support has been dispatched to the Indian Ocean.

VI. The Unconstitutionality of the War Contingency Bills

In April 2002 the Administration submitted three pieces of legislation to the Diet - “Emergency Legislation to Deal With Military Attacks from Abroad”, “The Self-Defense Revision Law”, and “The Security Council Revision Law” - which taken together constitute the War Contingency Bills. These laws are destined to transform Japan into a country that participates in war. Since the Constitution lays down the three great basic laws, the renunciation of war, the refusal to take part in combat, and the refusal to bear arms, the three bills are unconstitutional.

“Emergency Legislation to Deal With Military Attacks from Abroad” If they became law, new conditions would be created allowing the SDF to be deployed in a military situation; that is, not only if Japan itself were attacked, but if there existed “the fear of attack”, and even “a situation in which the conditions for an attack are seen to be likely.” However, according to the government’s explanation, “an armed attack from abroad” is not only a direct attack on Japanese territory but also an attack on SDF stationed abroad. In short, this law and the “Special Anti-Terrorism Law” passed last year would free the SDF to engage in combat when stationed abroad.

SDF Revision Clause 103 of the Self-Defense Law passed in 1954 provides wide authority to the SDF to conscript and use people, materiel, and land during mobilization “in the course of effectively and smoothly fulfilling its mission”. In reality regulations for the procurement of civilian resources during wartime have until now been so vague as to practically render the law impractical. The revision, in addition to clarifying the wording, creates special measures that would force any government office or agency to meet the demands of the SDF (see below). If it became law the freedoms, rights, and products of citizens would be transgressed by the SDF.

Related legislation Passage of the above legislation would also result in the establishment of a system to broadcast warnings and issue evacuation instructions; “Citizen Protections Laws” designed to minimize the influences on the economy and livelihood of the citizenry; detentions; use of radio waves; and regulations of sea and air transport that would ease restrictions on movement for both the SDF and US forces.

The footsteps of war are nigh War could come to Japan at any time were this legislation to pass, and the possibility will not diminish as long as US forces are stationed in Japan.

Major Points of the War Contingency Bills

I. “Emergency Legislation to Deal With Military Attacks from Abroad”

An act of armed aggression is defined as an attack from any country, the fear that such an attack may occur, or a situation in which an attack is likely to occur

“The rights and freedoms of the citizenry guaranteed by the Constitution” can be limited as necessary

The Prime Minister can order regional authorities or public organs to take appropriate actions

The public organs subject to this authority are: Bank of Japan, Japan Red Cross, NHK, and all other public organizations including electricity, gas, transport, and broadcasting

After passage within two years the following bills would also be implemented: measures for evacuation and casualty management of citizens; SDF use of radio airwave communications; provisions easing movement restrictions of the US military in Japan

II. “The Security Council Revision Law”

The Prime Minister could convene a special panel to deal with any military situation

The above panel would allow for the special attendance of cabinet officials in addition to elected Diet members

A special committee of military affairs experts would be established

III. “The Self-Defense Revision Law”

The SDF can take possession of privately-held properties

Existing structures on the property can be re-located

In the event of construction of military facilities, to assure security the use of weapons will be permitted as necessary

Anyone found to be illegally storing fuel or provisions will be liable to prison sentences not to exceed six months and/or fines not to exceed 300,000 yen

Individuals employed in the medical profession, construction or land management industries, or transport can by prefectural authority be ordered to render service

During SDF mobilization to facilitate its mission the following special measures will be enacted: 1) Infrastructure and transport to aid the movement of troops, 2) Measures pertaining to forests, docks, and land use to secure property, 3) Construction and fire prevention for the building of facilities, 4) Medicine and narcotics for health and hygiene, 5) grave sites and funeral services for the handling of the war dead.

Translation by Adam Lebowitz

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