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Sept
29, 1999
The
Looting of Russia
By
Mark Weisbrot
What
were they thinking? When executives at the Bank of New York saw billions
of dollars floating in from the home computer of a Russian businessman
with ties to organized crime there, did they really believe that these
were just ordinary profits?
The
biggest money-laundering scandal in history has prompted calls for a fresh
look at the role of American and IMF funds in Russia. To say this is long
overdue would be an understatement.
The
corruption is certainly mind- numbing in scale and scope, with some of
the West's favorite "reformers"-- including Konstantin Kagalovsky, the
former Russian representative at the IMF-- at the center of the investigation.
But the tribute that the Russian mafia skims off the top is just one part
of the looting of Russia.
The
other part has been scripted by Washington and its most powerful financial
institution: the International Monetary Fund. It is a different form of
pillage, to be sure. The robber barons who have taken over the Russian
economy since the fall of the Soviet Union have adopted the practice of
the Medici family of fifteenth century Florence: money to get power, power
to protect the money.
Washington's
money mandarins, on the other hand, descended upon Russia with enormous
wealth and power already in their possession. They have used both to colonize
Russia, turning a once developed economy into a Third World country.
The
results have been devastating. Over the last eight years, the economy has
shrunk by more than half. Russian men can now expect to die in their fifties.
The chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has noted that
the number of Russians living in poverty climbed from two million to sixty
million in just a few years.
Stiglitz,
who is one of America's most accomplished and respected economists, has
recently argued that these results "are not just due to sound policies
being poorly implemented." Rather, they are based on "a misunderstanding
of the very foundations of a market economy, as well as an excessive reliance
on textbook models of economics."
The
experience of the last year shows just how 180-degree wrong the foreign
experts can be. August 17th marked the first anniversary of the collapse
of the ruble, which fell from its fixed rate of about 6 to the dollar one
year ago to 25 today. The IMF poured in billions of dollars to prop up
the overvalued currency, and Washington predicted disaster for the Russians
if they did not maintain the fixed exchange rate. There would be hyperinflation,
they said, and sources of foreign capital would dry up. The economy would
fall apart.
A
year later, it is clear that the sky did not fall with the ruble. The threatened
hyperinflation did not occur-- inflation is running at about 45% for the
year. The currency's collapse made imports much more expensive, and gave
Russian industry a chance to get back on its feet. Industrial production
in July was up 12.8% over last year, and Russia's trade surplus has risen
more than tenfold.
Even
Russia's default on $40 billion of foreign debt, almost unthinkable until
it happened, has not really hurt the economy. True, foreign capital inflows
have fallen off sharply over the last year. But since these funds did little
more than inflate a speculative bubble in the financial sector-- encouraged
by the IMF's high interest rate, fixed exchange rate policy-- the productive
sectors were not greatly affected when the bubble burst.
It
has been one debacle after another since the IMF introduced its "shock
therapy" program in 1992. Like a battered spouse who sees no alternative
but to return to her abuser, Russia comes back to the IMF for more credits.
But the hundreds of billions that have fled the country in the 1990's have
cancelled out this "aid," as well as the meager foreign direct investment,
many times over. At the same time Russia has accumulated more than $150
billion in foreign debt, with the burden of debt service now reaching a
crushing 29% of export earnings.
At
some point any rational, non-corrupt political leader in Russia has to
question whether the country's friendly relations with Washington are worth
the price of continued impoverishment. That time may be approaching, as
Russia elects first a Parliament and then a President over the next 10
months. There will be calls from across the political spectrum to break,
or at least loosen, the chains that bind Russia to its Western tormentors.
The
American press will mostly dismiss these demands as nationalist finger-
pointing, and attribute Russia's demise to its failure to hew more closely
to the IMF's prescriptions. And Washington will pour in money, as it did
in the 1996 elections, to support its friends.
But
the Russians might well be better off cutting this toxic umbilical cord,
which could give them at least a fighting chance against the powerful domestic
criminal class that our own government-- and private sector-- has helped
to create.
Mark
Weisbrot is Research Director at the Preamble Center, in Washington, D.C.
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